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Abstract. The paper examines interregional insurance and redistribution of 
fiscal system in the Russian Federation during period 1995-2004. Three 
closely related models, several panel data techniques, and different variable 
specifications are used to check for the robustness of results. We find that 
the interregional insurance scheme compensates 20-35% – depending on the 
method, model and accounting – of a shock to the regional gross product. 
Estimates are more in line with the earlier estimates obtained for European 
countries (20-40%) compared to those of US and Canada (10-20%). The 
earlier literature reports also strong evidence that variation in the estimates 
is caused by different accounting choices. We do not find clear support for 
this result in the Russian case.  
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1. Introduction 
 
According to Oates (1999), in the fiscal federalism literature three roles for intergovernmental 
transfers are emphasized: internalization of spill over benefits over jurisdictions, fiscal equalization 
across jurisdictions, and an improved overall tax system. The discussion on lack of automatic 
stabilizers in the EMU emphasizes another role for intergovernmental transfers, i.e. stabilizing 
idiosyncratic regional shocks. Regional stabilization can appear in various forms. Typically 
interregional labour mobility softens economic shocks. As the exchange rate adjustment is lost in 
the EMU and the European wide labour mobility is weak and prices sticky, EU redistribution policy 
might act as an interregional insurance that works also as a stabilization tool.  
 
The natural question is that why the countries do not insure themselves through national or 
international capital markets. Concerning the EMU member countries this is a legitimate question 
but in federations such as Russia, the member regions face notable impediments for access to 
capital markets. Furthermore, even if there was complete access to capital markets, there are still 
economic incentives for a region to participate in a federation wide insurance scheme carried out 
through the fiscal system of federation. Von Hagen (1998) argues that especially if the self-insuring 
region is small, it might face higher borrowing than lending rates making fiscal based insurance 
scheme preferable.  
 
Empirical interregional insurance literature before Mélitz and Zumer (2002) did not have a 
consistent and unified approach1.  They – owing a lot to Bayoumi and Masson (1995) – took a 
major step towards creating a unified approach for estimating interregional insurance and 
redistribution. They constructed a rather general framework with several estimation techniques and 
accounting choices for the dependent variable. They concluded that the variation in estimates found 
in the previous literature can largely be explained by different accounting choices.  
 
The aim of this paper is to estimate the magnitude of interregional insurance and redistribution in 
Russia by extending the Mélitz and Zumer (2002) approach. Our dynamic model includes budget 
revenues and first lag of federal transfers (the dependent variable) as regressors in addition to the 
standard gross regional product. The estimated magnitude of redistribution embedded in the 
                                                 
1 A good example of this is the variety of names used in the literature for the subject: regional stabilization, fiscal  
   insurance, interregional risk sharing, intranational insurance and interstate insurance. Here we will refer to it as  
   interregional insurance.  
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Russian fiscal system is 13-15%. The estimated magnitude of insurance – defined as the change in 
federal net transfers in the case of transitory shock to regional gross product – in Russia is between 
20-35% depending on estimation method, model and accounting used. Some of our results suggest 
that the federal transfers have been in fact destabilizing. We do not find unambiguous support for 
the Mélitz’ and Zumer’s result of accounting as the main source of variation in the estimates.  
 
This paper will proceed as follows. In Section 2. we present shortly the issues discussed in the 
theoretical literature of interregional insurance and review some of previous empirical literature. 
Section 3. presents and discusses the regression models and techniques. It also reports the 
estimation results. Section 4 concludes the paper. Some additional results are found in the 
Appendices. 
 
2. Previous literature  
 
Several theoretical and empirical papers have been written on interregional insurance. Most of the 
research started in the 1990s. It is first useful to review some of the discussion in the theoretical 
literature (see also von Hagen 1998 and Vigneault 2000). 
 
2.1. Theoretical literature 
The themes of relevant theoretical literature can be roughly divided into three partly overlapping 
categories: information and incentives issues, political economy issues, and macroeconomic issues. 
As an example of the first category, Persson and Tabellini (1996a) modelled the moral hazard 
problems on an interregional insurance scheme where the federation wide risk-sharing may induce 
local policies that increase local risk. Another example is Lockwood (1999) who considers 
information asymmetry which can realize in two ways. The central government can observe either 
the physical output of a public good or the revenue raised by the regional governments. His main 
results are that transfers induce qualitative distortion in the public good supply that varies 
depending on the source of the shock and oversupply (rather than undersupply) of the public good is 
very possible. Secondly, in the presence of interregional spillovers, it turns out that the public good 
supply is subject to two-way distortion in such a way that in the regions where the demand for the 
stochastic public good is highest (lowest) the public good is oversupplied (undersupplied).   
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Concerning the political economy issues, the discussion includes themes mainly concerned with the 
design of the insurance scheme. For example, the timing of voting vis-à-vis policy actions and the 
nature of the tax system have high significance considering the theoretical results of an optimal 
insurance scheme. The complexity of the issue is visible in Lockwood’s (1999) paper. He finds that 
in his model (with Cobb-Douglas preferences and spillovers absent), if regions differ in incomes 
and face lump-sum taxes, the interregional insurance system results to an undersupply of the public 
good whereas a  system of distortionary taxes results to oversupply. Persson and Tabellini (1996b) 
assume that regions have different risk characteristics and argue that efficient risk-sharing involves 
full insurance but requires a risk premium to be paid by the riskier region to the less risky region. 
This would be implemented through a combination of region-dependent and region-independent 
transfers. They show that full insurance along with efficient risk premium can be obtained through 
Nash bargain (or unanimity vote) among agents representing each region whereas majority voting 
in each region separately does not produce efficient equilibrium. 
  
An interesting theoretical political economy discussion, motivated by the EMU, is the distinction 
between interregional transfers and intertemporal transfers (stabilization2). This distinction is 
highlighted by Fatás (1998) and Bayoumi and Masson (1998). The fundamental issue here is the 
nature of fiscal stabilization, i.e. whether it is implemented across regions or across time. Regions 
can provide insurance to their citizens by running countercyclical budgets. However, interregional 
transfers are provided by the federal level as a redistribution of income between the regions. The 
main concern here is the Ricardian equivalence- hypothesis.  Intertemporal transfers are subjected 
to the Ricardian equivalence since they have to be paid back from the future budgets (assuming that 
government expenditures remain unchanged in cyclical fluctuations) and – if we are in a perfect 
Ricardian world – transfers lose their effectiveness because they have no effect on output or 
consumers’ welfare. Purely interregional transfers on the other hand avoid the Ricardian 
equivalence effect because consumers are not worried about increased future liabilities since the 
transfers are funded from the income of the better off regions. Thus, as Fatás (ibid.) concludes, 
interregional transfers are more efficient than intertemporal ones and hence better for provision of 
regional insurance. This argument also provides one justification for federal-based insurance 
                                                 
2  Fatás use of term stabilization can be confusing. Some authors, such as Büttner (1999), use the term stabilization in  
   the  sense which interregional insurance is used in this paper, whereas its meaning is different in Fatás (1998). 
 3
scheme since residents of a self-insuring region borrowing from capital markets expect the loans to 
be paid in the future with higher taxes. 
 
Fatás (1998) has analyzed the interaction between interregional insurance and the Ricardian 
equivalence further. Suppose one region of the federation goes into recession and incomes of other 
regions and expenditures remain unchanged. As a result, the federal budget goes into deficit. This 
creates expectations for future tax liabilities for all regions to cover the current federal deficit, 
which results into some degree of Ricardian equivalence. Thus, an interregional insurance scheme 
where a pool of money is collected from taxes and redistributed across regions on an equalizing 
basis is not necessarily free from the offsetting effect of the Ricardian equivalence. There is 
necessarily some degree of insurance in the system – assuming some level of idiosyncrasy – as the 
region in recession has to pay only its share of future increase in tax payments which is notably 
smaller than the current foregone tax incomes caused by the recession. But also the intertemporal 
stabilization effect is present as the region receives a postponement for the necessity of balancing its 
budget today thanks to the insurance scheme. The insurance and stabilization, in the sense that Fatás 
is using them, are difficult to distinguish unambiguously in empirical work. Furthermore, the 
Ricardian effect is mitigated if the consumers do not fully internalize the future tax payments.  
 
Finally, we shortly present some of the macroeconomic considerations related to interregional 
insurance. Even though an interregional insurance scheme is designed to bring stability in the 
economies of individual regions, the scheme itself might develop – both positive and negative – 
implications affecting the whole federation level. Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1991) argue that the 
federally provided interregional insurance scheme has been an important reason why the fixed 
exchange regime existing within the United States has survived without extensive problems. They 
also address the need for the EMU for a similar arrangement. Sanguinetti and Tommasi (2004) 
concern the potential negative implications. They focus on a macroeconomic trade-off related to 
federal fiscal arrangements, i.e. the trade-off between providing interregional insurance and 
providing sufficient incentives for aggregate fiscal discipline. The key assumption is that the 
realized regional income is unobserved to the federal government. Sanguinetti and Tommasi show 
that the economy can be subjected to the tragedy of fiscal commons through excessive sub-national 
spending and lower level provision of federal public good such as macroeconomic stability. Von 
Hagen (1998) constructs a simple model in which interregional insurance is provided through rules-
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based transfer scheme aimed at reducing income differences between the regions. He shows how 
the insurance scheme conflict between national and regional stabilization can emerge, and how the 
effectiveness of monetary policy can improve or reduce depending on it. 
 
2.2. Previous empirical literature  
Next we focus on empirical results and methods used in previous studies (see also von Hagen 1998, 
Mélitz and Zumer 2002, and Vigneault 2000). We overview in somewhat details the debate related 
to empirics of interregional insurance. We will first present the research carried out with the US 
data which has deserved the most attention. The methods and results are summarized in Table 1. 
After that we will present research conducted on other countries – summarized in Table 2 – and 
lastly we discuss the system and earlier literature of interregional insurance in Russia. 
 
The MacDougall Report (European Commission, 1977) on viable EMU initiated the empirical 
discussion on interregional insurance by presenting estimates for interregional insurance and 
redistribution. Due to its poor methodology, we will not reproduce here the report’s estimates (see 
von Hagen 1998). After the MacDougall Report it took almost fifteen years before the next paper 
on the subject was published. This was the study of Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1991). It has become 
one of the most influential and debated paper in the field. The empirical methods had improved 
dramatically from the time of the MacDougall Report. Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1991) used 3SLS-
method with two separate equations to analyse the shock absorption of federal taxes and transfers in 
the US. They obtained an estimate for the combined insurance effect of taxes and transfers around 
33-40% for a shock on regional personal incomes. In their analysis the redistributive role of these 
money flows were taken into account only implicitly. 
 
Very soon von Hagen (1992) published his estimates along with criticism on Sala-i-Martin’s and 
Sachs’ (1991) work. His criticism was that they did not distinguish between permanent and 
transitory shocks i.e. between redistribution and insurance. Von Hagen’s approach was to run Sala-
i-Martin’s and Sachs’ regression in first differences using state gross products as the dependent 
variable. His estimate for the insurance effect was considerably lower, approximately 10% whereas 
his estimate for redistribution was actually a bit higher. Fatás (1998) brought a new perspective to 
the discussion. It was the problem of difference between insurance and stabilization discussed 
above. According to Fatás (1998, see also von Hagen 1998) von Hagen’s (1992) approach manages 
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to avoid this problem whereas Sala-i-Martin’s and Sachs’ (1991) does not. This could explain the 
notable difference in the estimates.  
 
The approaches of Fatás (1998) as well as Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (1998 and 2001) are 
similar but quite exceptional in relation to the rest of empirical literature. Fatás defines and analyses 
interregional insurance as the reduction of volatility (standard deviation) in permanent regional 
income. Athanasoulis and van Wincooop measure the interregional risk sharing by analysing the 
reduction in standard deviation of state specific income growth uncertainty obtained through federal 
fiscal policy (and financial markets). Both studies obtain similar estimates for insurance that are 
more in line with von Hagen (1992) than with Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1991). Fatás and 
Athanasoulis and van Wincoop were, however, not the first to approach the estimation through the 
standard deviation. In their influential paper Asdrubali et al. (1996) constructed their estimable 
equations by decomposing the period-by-period cross sectional variance of gross state product into 
smoothed and unsmoothed parts. The former was determined by capital markets, credit markets,  
 
Table 1: Estimates and estimation methods for interregional insurance and  
              redistribution in the United Statesa 
 
Author Method for estimating 
Insurance 
Insurance  
effect, % 
Redistribution, 
% 
Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1991) 3SLS 33-40 
von Hagen (1992) 
1st difference OLS for 
stabilization, level OLS for 
redistribution 
10 47 
Goodhart and Smith (1993) Same as von Hagen (1992) 13 15 
Pisani-Ferry et al.(1993) Simulation 17  
Bayoumi and Masson (1995)a 3SLS 7-30 7-22 
Asdrubali et al. (1996) GLS 13  
Fatás (1998) Standard deviation analysis 11  
del Negro (1998)b
i.i.d., AR(1), VAR(1), trend 
specifications 20-30  
Obstfeld and Peri (1998) Bivariate VAR 10 19 
Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2001) Standard deviation analysis 14  
Mélitz and Zumer (2002)a
Level OLS, 1st difference, 
dynamic GMM 4-27 7-21 
a. The given estimates of Bayoumi and Masson (1995) and Mélitz and Zumer (2002) vary depending on the  
    broadness of the measure for net intergovernmental transfers used method and for the latter also on the estimation  
    method used. 
b. del Negro (1998) measures risk sharing with respect to shocks to the overall level of wealth rather than to the  
    current income. 
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and federal government.  They obtain a result that a total of 75 per cents of the shocks to gross state 
products were smoothed and federal government’s share was 13 percentage points.  
 
Bayoumi and Masson (1995) agree von Hagen’s (1992) view on the importance of distinguishing 
between redistribution and insurance, and test the two with separate equations (cross-sectional and 
time series, respectively). Bayoumi and Masson (ibid.) were first to use the disposable value of 
regional (personal) incomes as the dependent variable instead of transfers explicitly. They were also 
the first to emphasize the accounting phenomena. The term was used by Mélitz and Zumer (2002, 
M-Z from here onwards) for the extent of federal money flows included when constructing the 
variable. The more equalizing money flows are included in the regression, i.e. the wider the 
definition of transfers is, the bigger insurance effect we should obtain. Bayoumi and Masson obtain 
estimates for insurance varying from almost von Hagen (1992) to Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1991), 
depending on the width of included flows. Also Asdrubali et al. (1996) studied the insurance role of 
separate federal flows and concluded that most of the federal shock smoothing was carried out 
through direct federal transfers to individuals (excluding unemployment benefits). 
 
The biggest contribution of M-Z is that they seem to be able to explain most of the differences of 
the estimates in the interregional insurance literature. They test for interregional insurance with 
three different estimation techniques – level OLS, first differences and dynamic GMM – for four 
different countries. However, their main argument is that the difference in insurance estimates 
obtained in previous studies lies strictly on accounting. In their estimations, different methods 
produce a dispersion of about five percentage points while different accounting selections produce a 
dispersion of some 15 percentage points. Thus the selection of the personal incomes or gross 
product as the regressor plays the crucial role. According to M-Z, both specifications are correct but 
only in proper context, which may require corresponding adjustment of selected federal transfers, 
i.e. the dependent variable. If we choose personal incomes, we should include all federal transfers to 
the residents. However, if we choose gross regional product (GRP), we should also include all 
transfers to lower level governments and firms because residents receive benefits also from these 
instances. Furthermore, M-Z note that it is likely that lower estimates for insurance are obtained 
when using GRP rather than personal incomes since GRP per capita figures are considerably larger 
than personal income figures. M-Z reject the critique posed by von Hagen (1992) to Sala-i-Martin 
and Sachs (1991). M-Z note that they obtain similar results regardless of level or first difference 
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regression for Sala-i-Martin and Sachs data. Thus the difference lies in different accounting, as 
Sala-i-Martin and Sachs used regional personal incomes and von Hagen used GRP. M-Z reject also, 
on account of their empirics, the critique of Fatás (1998) concerning deficit spending by the federal 
government.  
 
Some additional criticism, not-discussed by M-Z, is also found. del Negro’s (1998) appraisal is 
quite fundamental concerning the whole approach to interregional insurance. He argues that if 
individuals and regional governments are able to borrow and lend, then shocks to the expected 
present value of lifetime resources rather than shocks to current income affect agent's decisions and 
welfare. Thus, risk-sharing should also be analyzed empirically against shocks to wealth rather than 
to current income. His estimates for interregional insurance in the US were approximately 20-30 per 
cents, somewhat higher than other studies’ estimates on the average. 
 
Finally, von Hagen and Hepp (2000) tested interregional insurance and found that the equalization 
scheme in Germany, so called Finanzausgleich, provides hardly any smoothing to transitory shocks 
against GRP and also only little redistribution compared to other countries. However, the scheme 
smoothes more than half on transitory shocks to regional per capita tax collection around the federal 
average. Furthermore, it produces more than full redistribution for regions with tax collections 
below the federal average. Von Hagen and Hepp address the importance of distinguishing between 
insurance aimed at the private sector and the one aimed at regional budgets. Besides von Hagen and 
Hepp, this part of the accounting issue is addressed only by Kadotchnikov (2003)3. It has some 
importance as in many countries, e.g. in Russia, the equalization system is designed to smooth tax 
capacity. It is noteworthy that these both studies do not address the problem of endogeneity which 
is more likely to incur when regional tax incomes, rather than regional gross incomes, are used as 
the “shock variable”. 
 
Besides US and Germany, estimations for interregional insurance have been conducted with data 
for Canada, France, UK and Italy. International comparison of the estimates is difficult due to 
different kinds of equalization schemes, which complicates the selection of proper accounting for 
international comparability. However the estimates for insurance in these countries seem to fall 
approximately in the range of 10-20 percents with the exception of Germany. Concerning 
                                                 
3  It is also shortly mentioned in Vigneault (2002) when referring to von Hagen and  Hepp (2000). 
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redistribution, there is more variation. The rather low estimates for Italy by Obstfeld and Peri 
(1998) are probably due to accounting as the authors had to limit their analysis only on social 
insurance flows that provide rather partial picture of total equalizing fiscal flows. This argument is 
supported by the results of Decressin (1999) who uses broader measure of equalizing fiscal flows, 
with similar methods, and obtained clearly higher estimates for Italy. Decressin uses probably the 
broadest measure of all studies as he includes into the equalizing flows also the central 
government’s investments and expenditures on consumption in the regions. Decressin justifies his 
approach by the fact that in many countries public expenditures have relatively important role in 
regional economies, and that e.g. public sector wages – that are clearly countercyclical due to their 
rigidness – are paid from these expenditure flows 
 
Table 2: Estimates for interregional insurance and redistribution in other  
                     countries 
 
Author Method for estimating 
Insurance 
Insurance  
effect, % 
Redistribution, 
% 
Canada    
Goodhart and Smith (1993) See table 1 12-19  
Bayoumi and Masson (1995) See table 1 3-17 2-39 
Obstfeld and Peri (1998) See table 1 13 53 
Mélitz and Zumer (2002) See table 1 4-21 3-24 
France    
Pisany-Ferry et al. (1993) See table 1 37  
Mélitz  and  Zumer (2002) See table 1 17-19 38 
Germany    
Pisany-Ferry et al. (1993) See table 1 34-42  
von Hagen and  Hepp (2000)a Fixed effects OLS 3.4, 56 8.2, 114 
Italy    
Obstfeld and Peri (1998) See table 1 3 8 
Decressin (1999)b Bivariate VAR 5; 20-30 20; 30-35 
UK    
Goodhart and Smith (1993) See table 1 21  
Mélitz and Zumer (2002) See table 1 21-26 26 
              a. The first figure relates to a regression of transfers on regional incomes whereas the second relates  
                   to regression on regional tax revenues.  
               b. Depending on broadness of the measure. 
 
2.2. The system and previous empirical literature of interregional insurance in Russia 
In the early years of Russia’s transition there was no legislation that stated any explicit 
arrangements for intergovernmental transfers. The role of transfers was supplanted in the Soviet 
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Union time and in the early years of transition by a complex, negotiation-based tax sharing system 
between the federal and sub-national governments.  A major disadvantage of the system was that it 
tried to address two tasks – balancing both vertical and horizontal imbalances4 – with a single 
policy tool i.e. the tax sharing rate. These rates were chosen to balance the revenue division 
between the sub-national and the federal governments, and in addition, to reduce fiscal disparities 
among the regions (Wallich 1994). According to Martinez-Vazques and Boex (2001) this 
bargaining based and non-transparent system – characteristic to whole Russian fiscal system of the 
time – exposed it to bad incentives and soft budget constraints.  
 
A notable step towards the better was taken in 1994 when the part of the transfers aimed at reducing 
horizontal instability was subjected to formula-based mechanism, so called Fund for Financial 
Support of Regions (FFSR), which was and is funded from VAT collections. The rest of the 
transfers remained as non-transparent and usually ad hoc based lump-sum subventions prone to 
political manipulation and pressure. Initially the FFSR determined the allocation by classifying the 
regions in need of support as those that had below the average (per capita) revenues in a base year. 
In addition, regions with insufficient funds for financing their expenditure needs still after the 
support would get supplementary financial aid. The FFSR formula was later improved by 
simplifying it, and using better proxies for fiscal capacity and expenditure needs than the actual 
amounts of a base year (see e.g. Makushkin et al. 2001 for through description on the FFSR). 
 
The FFSR was intended to be the sole funnel of support between the centre and the regions. In 
reality a lot of funds were allocated through more informal channels during almost the whole 
decade (Solanko and Tekoniemi 2002), and in some years other types of transfers exceeded the 
amount of the FFSR (Martinez-Vazques and Boex 2001). Total amount of money allocated to the 
fund was decided in the annual federal budget. However the funding rule changed virtually every 
year. There have been several adjustments to the allocation rule of the FFSR and clear progress in 
mitigating the bad incentives present in the original system. Although the FFSR is currently the 
most important channel for distributing equalizing funds, the share of the non-transparent mutual 
settlements flows is still notable. 
 
                                                 
4 Vertical imbalance refers to the difference between regional mandates and funds available for their implementation.  
   Horizontal imbalance refers to a situation where there are different revenue endowments or capabilities of revenue  
   collection across sub-national governments. 
 10
To our knowledge, the Russian Federation is the first – and thus far only – non-OECD and/or 
transition country of which any research on interregional insurance has been conducted. 
Furthermore, only one research has been carried out on Russia (Kadotchnikov et al. 2003) although 
there are numerous studies of other aspects of the Russian fiscal federalism (see e.g. Zhuravskaya, 
2000 and Le Houerou and Rutkowski, 1996). The lack of research on this field concerning the 
transitional economies is understandable as we are only now beginning to have sufficiently long and 
sufficiently reliable data for these countries. 
 
Kadotchnikov et al. (ibid.)5 studied the impact of three different insurance flow measures on 
changes in GRP and budget revenues in Russia in 1994-2001. These flows are aggregate transfers6, 
aggregate tax revenues rendered to the federal level, and net federal tax as a difference between the 
two. They use three different model specifications and estimate the insurance in pairs of years rather 
than as a panel data. They justify this approach on time varying coefficients which could be indeed 
the case concerning Russia’s turbulent transition.  
 
Their estimates suggest that there was virtually no redistribution across regional GRPs through the 
fiscal system till 1996. They explain this by the fact that in the early years of transition the amount 
of federal transfers to regions depended on jointly planned regional budgets for the next period 
rather than the fiscal state of the region. For 1998-2001 they obtain significant estimates for GRP 
redistribution ranging approximately from 10-17 percents for the tax rendered to federal level 
measure. Concerning tax revenue redistribution through federal transfers, they find significant 
redistributive effect in 1994-1999 ranging from 10-47 percents. They explain the statistically non-
existent relation in 2000-2001 with newly introduced principles of intergovernmental transfer 
allocation. The amount of federal transfer allocation for 2000 was calculated in 1999 according to 
pre-crisis 1997 statistics and in 2001 fiscal and budget reforms aimed at distributing federal 
transfers according to expenditure needs rather than tax capacity. However, redistribution of budget 
revenues through federal was significant for whole estimation period with redistribution effect 
varying from 50 up to almost 80%.  
 
Concerning GRP insurance through fiscal flows, authors failed to find any clear tendency in the 
estimation period. They conclude that the fiscal system was not used as an insurance against GRP 
                                                 
5 The Russian version of their paper, available at www.iet.ru, is by far more comprehensive. 
6  Kadotchnikov et al. use a term grant-in-aid for federal non-repayable transfers. 
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shocks. However, the insurance effect of federal taxes on regional budget revenues appeared to be 
persistent and vary from 25 up to 93 percent with very high explanatory power. Quite interestingly, 
unlike federal taxes the federal transfers failed to show any significant stabilizing effect on regional 
budget revenues excluding the very end of the period. This result raises an interesting question. If 
the transfers were, generally speaking, not targeted for GRP or budget revenue stabilization, then 
what has determined their allocation throughout the transition? This result contradicts previous 
literature which has found a stabilizing effect of transfers either for GRP shocks (majority of 
previous studies) or for budget revenue shocks (e.g. von Hagen and Hepp 2000). 
 
3. Estimating interregional insurance in the Russian federation 
 
In this paper we are able to extend the Kadotchnikov et al. (2003) estimation period (1994-2001) to 
1995-2004 (see data description in Appendix A). Contrary to Kadotchnikov et al., we will drop year 
1994 as it contains still considerable data unreliability. Unfortunately, our results are not directly 
comparable with Kadotchnikov et al. as they report annual estimates whereas here we analyse the 
whole period as one with panel data methods and we are using a narrower selection of variables. 
 
Here we follow the approach adopted in Mélitz and Zumer (M-Z, 2002), i.e. use different panel data 
methods and different accounting measures. We extend the estimation methods used by M-Z. 
However, we unfortunately cannot perform as comprehensive accounting analysis due to data 
limitations. We will first present the basic model by M-Z and our results with the Russian data and 
then introduce simple but justified augmentations to their model.  
 
3.1. The basic model 
M-Z proposed a general equation from which they derive the separate equations for interregional 
insurance and redistribution. They adopted the definitions of insurance and redistribution by 
Bayoumi and Masson (1995) and Obstfeld and Peri (1998), and combined them in a single 
equation. Consider a model 
 
    (3.1)          itiitSiDdit XXXY εββα +−++= )(            ( i = 1, 2, …,M     t = 1, 2, …, T )   
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where Xit is the gross regional product per capita (GRP) divided by the national average; Yit – also a 
percentage figure – is the disposable value of Xit after adding net federal transfers (which can be 
either positive or negative) from the fiscal system7, iX  is the average of X for region i over the 
whole time period. Due to considerable differences between regional inflation rates in Russia, 
dividing the annual data by the national averages will not remove the inflation completely. Thus the 
Russian data was also deflated with region specific consumer price inflation to constant prices of 
year 19958. Equation (3.1) can now be decomposed into two parts: 
 
           (3.2)                                            iiDdi XY ηβα ++=    
    
           (3.3)                                    itiitSiit XXYY μβ +−=− )(    
   
 
These two equations add up to Eq. 3.1) as εit = µit + ηi. Parameter βD will produce an estimate for 
regional redistribution since it is related to permanent regional product (the average) whereas βS is 
related to transitory regional product (deviation from the average). Finally, M-Z depart from 
assumption of strictly contemporary insurance suggested by equations (3.2) and (3.3) and argue that 
a dynamic model with lagged influences is more fitting: 
 
           (3.4)                                   
0
( )
L
it i j it i it
j
Y Y X Xβ μ−
=
− = − +∑    
  
 
where L is the number of lags. In their paper, M-Z have included lags from four to five depending 
on the country under scrutiny. However, with the Russian data, we have to content with 
considerably shorter lags due to the relatively short data set. Due to the short data set, we will take 
the approach of including one lag in the basic model and two to three in the augmented model. As is 
shown later on, depart from purely contemporary insurance has significance concerning the 
estimates with the Russian data.  
  
                                                 
7 Net transfers are calculated by adding up transfers from federal to regional level and deducting from these the money 
rendered from the regional to the federal level. Note that if we want to assess the direct effect of GRP on net transfers 
(say, Z) we have to do a transformation of coefficient from β to (β-1). This is due to the fact that Y is defined as Y = 
X+Z, thus the regression for the direct effect would have the form Z=(β -1)X + µ following from the specification 
X+Z= βX + µ. 
8 Dividing by national average has, however, one country specific advantage. It will remove any potential problems  
   caused by the 1998 monetary reform in Russia when three zeros were removed from all monetary figures. 
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The M-Z model is somewhat non-standard concerning dynamic models as the starting point is a 
model in which the independent variable is deducted by its region specific mean. The aim of this 
approach is to distinguish two concurrent but separate influences on regional income and not to 
remove any regional fixed affects contrary to possible first impressions. The first influence reflects 
the change in the average income over the whole period. This is the redistribution effect (equation 
3.2). The second one reflects changes in transitory income compared to the average income. This 
relates to insurance (equations 3.3 and 3.4). Basically we are assuming (although not explicitly 
stated in M-Z) that the policy maker compares region’s income development to its long run average 
in order to determine the possible financial aid. This would require an assumption of rational 
expectations of the policy maker for the long run average income.  
 
Furthermore, using more sophisticated methods will require moving to first differences. Through 
first differencing equation (3.3) we will in arrive to a regression equation  
 
             (3.5)                             it i S it itY d X vβΔ = + Δ + . 
 
 
Note that we would get this model also from the more standard equation when L=0 
 
                                                    .   
   
,
L
it i j i t j it
j o
Y Xα β −
=
= + +∑ e
                                                
This is due to the fact first differencing the equation will remove all region fixed effects as well as 
the averages. Here we will use the popular estimating technique for dynamic models which 
alleviates the potential problem of endogeneity with the X variables. This approach was proposed 
by Arellano and Bond (1991)9 and it is a GMM-based dynamic panel data method utilizing the 
orthogonality conditions between the differences of residuals and lagged values of the endogenous 
variables. Thus the results are obtained via difference model estimations. M-Z were the first to use 
this technique for interregional insurance estimation. However, it is important to note that the model 
of M-Z will not produce same results with the Arellano-Bond technique as the standard equation. 
This is due to the fact that although the estimated equation is the same in both cases after first 
differencing, the instruments used are different. Lagged deviations from the averages are used in 
 
9 Although the time period in our study still rather short compared to e.g. Mélitz and Zumer (2002), Bond (2002) argues  
   that the Arellano-Bond estimation technique used in Mélitz and Zumer (ibid.) and also here is especially suitable for    
panel data of relatively short time and relatively large amount of individuals. 
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(3.5) and lagged levels in standard equation. We tested for both approached with the Russian data 
and obtained differences of some 1-3 percentage points. However, the test statistics for residual 
AR(1)- and AR(2)- process as well as the Hansen’s test for overidentified restrictions were clearly 
better when using the M-Z specification (Eq. 3.4). Thus we depart from the standard equation 
model here. 
 
In addition to the Arellano-Bond estimation we will also use – following the approach of M-Z – 
level OLS (Sala-i-Martin and Sachs 1991) and first differenced OLS (von Hagen 1992) to check 
how the estimation technique affects the estimates for interregional insurance. M-Z concluded that 
the estimation technique appears to be less important source of variation in estimates than the 
accounting choice of the federal net transfers, at least concerning the data for US and Canada. 
 
3.2 Results for the basic model with Russian data 
Table 3 reports the results for interregional redistribution and insurance of replicating the M-Z 
regression with Russian data. Our narrowest accounting choice for federal net transfers is taxes (and 
other compulsory payments) rendered from the regional to the federal government. A wider choice 
is to include federal non-repayable transfers to the region in net transfers. The widest choice 
includes also the net of budget loans. The third one is based on the claim by Makushkin et al. 
(2001). They argue that budget loans are in reality one type of federal financial aid to Russian 
regions. According to our knowledge, budget loans’ role in interregional insurance and 
redistribution has not been tested before. Contrary to reporting style of M-Z the redistributing or 
stabilizing effect is presented with a negative sign following the intuitive logic that lower GRP 
leads to higher net transfers and vice versa.   
 
The results show that the redistributive effect is clearly present in the Russian fiscal system with 
some 12-15 per cent magnitude. Interestingly, however, the results suggest that while taxes to 
federal government have been equalizing, the federal transfers have been in fact un-equalizing as 
the redistributive effect diminishes when federal transfers are added into the net transfers. Thus, the 
logic of bigger equalizing and stabilizing effects following broader accounting - working nicely in 
M-Z - does not hold here. In fact, Kadotchnikov et al. (2003) and von Hagen and Hepp (2000) 
obtained similar counter-intuitive results with Russian and German data. Another noteworthy fact  
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Table 3: Interregional redistribution and insurance of gross regional product in  
               Russia 
 
   Stabilization 
 Redistribution,    
Eq. (3.2)  
 Level, 
Eq. (3.3) 
 First differences 
 Eq. (3.5)c
 
 (βD-1) R2 (βS-1) R2 (βS-1) R2
Rendered taxes -0.148*** 
(31.06)a
0.987 
[0.690]b
-0.320*** 
(9.82) 
0.700 
[0.341] 
-0.190*** 
 (11.38) 
0.801 
[0.224] 
Rendered taxes and 
transfers 
-0.126*** 
(18.8) 
0.972 
[0.418] 
-0.370*** 
(8.57) 
0.485 
[0.246] 
-0.196*** 
 (11.56) 
0.718 
[0.254] 
Rendered taxes, 
transfers and loans 
-0.126*** 
(18.6) 
0.971 
[0.410] 
-0.379*** 
(8.40) 
0.466 
[0.245] 
-0.215***  
(11.59) 
0.701 
[0.270] 
       
       
 
Stabilization: Dynamic A-Bd 
Eq. (3.4) 
A-B test    
for AR(1):   
z-value,    
(p-value) 
A-B test 
for AR(2): 
z-value,        
(p-value) 
Hansen test,       
χ2-value, 
(p-value) 
Number of 
instruments/ 
number of 
groups 
 
-j
βe  Σβ-j 
(Pr > χ2) 
    
Rendered taxes β0=-0.397*** 
(6.76) 
β-1=-0.04  
   (-0.78) 
-0.437 
(0.000) 
-1.44  
(0.150) 
-1.32  
(0.187) 
46.30 
 (0.078) 
36/79 
Rendered taxes and 
transfers 
β0=-0.365*** 
(7.56) 
β-1=-0.082       
(-1.63) 
-0.447 
(0.000) 
-0.83  
(0.408) 
-1.30 
(0.194) 
49.54  
(0.041) 
36/79 
Rendered taxes, 
transfers and loans 
β0=-0.372***  
(7.52) 
β-1=-0.085*   
 (-1.68) 
-0.457 
(0.000) 
-0.52  
(0.601) 
-1.19 
(0.234) 
47.26 
 (0.065) 
36/79 
Significance levels are denoted by asterisks: *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, 1 % level, respectively. 
a. In the parentheses of regressions for equations 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 are t-values based on heteroskedasticity robust  
    standard errors.   
b. The figures in the brackets are the R2 when net transfers were used as dependent variable instead of disposable value  
     of X. The disposable value tends to give very high R-squared due to the construction of the variables. Otherwise the  
     results between the two variable specifications were identical for this table. 
c. Regional constants are not reported and none of them was significant. Regressions produce only small differences in  
    estimates whether or not the regional constants were included. 
d. In the Arellano-Bond regression the more efficient two step method is reported instead of one step. It is robust to  
    heteroskedastic and serially correlated standard errors. The downward bias of the standard errors in the two step  
    method is corrected with Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction. Furthermore, the difference in the results  
    between the two approaches was very small.  
e. Necessary transformation (β-1) for overall insurance effect summation has already been done for the reported figure.  
    M-Z report the insurance effect with a positive sign but here we take the approach as reporting it with its actual sign  
    (negative) in the regression. The interpretation of the insurance coefficient is, naturally, the same in both approaches. 
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is that budget loans seem to posses no redistributive role. Concerning the insurance effect, on the 
other hand, we find the expected logic of accounting width to hold. Also the budget loans appear to 
have a stabilizing effect as argued by Makushkin et al. (2001). While M-Z found only small 
differences between the results in levels and first differenced regression, we report notable 
difference in the results between these two estimation techniques. In level regressions we find some 
32-38% insurance effect while first difference regression produces effect around 20%. Due to 
definition of the dependent variable as a disposable value of the independent variable, the values for 
R2 are generally unrealistically high (as was in M-Z). The R2 for regressions with net transfers 
explicitly as the dependent variable (as e.g. in von Hagen, 1992), are visible in the table in brackets. 
They were generally clearly lower than in case of regression with disposable X as the dependent 
variable. Also t-statistics were considerably smaller. The estimates as such were naturally the same 
with both definitions10. 
 
Concerning the dynamic model, Table 3. clearly shows some rejecting test statistics. This is despite 
the fact that we report here the most efficient specification of Xit which treats it as a predetermined 
variable. Note that as AR(1)-test assumes the null hypothesis of absence of first order 
autocorrelation in residuals, we would  typically expect to obtain p-values far from zero. However if 
the residuals in levels are uncorrelated, we would expect error term AR(1) to be significant as the 
estimation is based on first differences. On this setting the AR(2) –residual test values are more 
important. For corrected specification p-values of AR(2) tests must be far from zero. Similarly we 
would expect p-values far from zero for the Hansen test if the instruments are correctly specified, 
i.e. uncorrelated with the residuals. However, Table 3. reports p-values below 0.10  indicating that 
instrument choice has not been proper one. In the dynamic model, the coefficients for Xit are close 
to that in the levels model. When we add the coefficient of Xi,t-1  the combined insurance effects 
grows to around 45%. The logic of wider accounting seems to hold also for the dynamic A-B 
model. 
 
                                                 
10 As M-Z note in their paper, the choice between net transfers and disposable value of GRP is of little importance  
    considering the results also in the dynamic model. This is natural as the difference is merely algebraic, i.e. we can  
    restore the estimate for insurance in case of net transfers from the disposable GRP model by deducting unity from the  
    coefficient of current X. Concerning the dynamic model, the lagged coefficients can be used as such. But, as we will  
    show, the situation is not so straightforward in the augmented model. 
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To sum-up, when we replicate the M-Z regressions with Russian data we arrive to some 
contradictory results. First, there are considerable differences between the estimates from three 
methods varying some 20 percentage points between first differences and dynamic models. The 
latter could be unreliable because lack of proper instruments. Secondly, the logic of wider 
accounting does not hold in the redistribution case. We will show below that the accounting logic 
fails also with insurance in the augmented models. This failure could be a result of Russian 
peculiarities. Note that the Russian transfer system is designed to equalize tax capacity – as is the 
German system – not regional incomes per se. In addition, several researchers in the Russian fiscal 
federalism literature claim that that the redistribution of federal transfers has been plagued by 
political motives11. These aspects would, naturally, cause biases in regressing transfers on economic 
variables. 
 
3.3. Augmented models and estimation results 
Next we test with Arellano-Bond method two model extensions for sake of robustness, fiscal 
reasoning and country specific factors. First modification adds first lag of the dependent variable in 
the model as an explanatory variable. Inclusion of lagged Y as an explanatory variable is often 
justified in economic terms and proves to be the case also here. Longer lags of Y turned out to be 
statistically insignificant. Consider the model of M-Z with an addition of lagged Y deducted by the 
region’s whole period average of Y.   
 
 
                (3.6)               itiitSiDitidit XXXYYY εββφα +−++−+= − )()( 1, .  
  
 
Applying similar manipulations as in the original model, we will get new equation for estimating 
interregional insurance. Whereas equation for redistribution remains the same, Equation (3.5) for 
insurance now becomes12
                                                 
11 See e.g. Popov (2002) and Treisman (1998). 
12 In this specification we have to be careful when switching between definitions of the dependent variable (net transfers  
    versus disposable GRP). If we denote net transfers with Z (+ or -), and thus Y=X+Z we get from Equation 3.7) that:      
           , 1 , 1 ,
2
1( ) ( 1)( ) ( )( ) ( )
L
it i t i it i i t i i t j i it
j
jZ Z Z Z X X X X X Xϕ β β ϕ β− −
=
− −− = − + − − + + − + − +∑ u− . 
   Thus, transforming from disposable GRP (Y) to net transfers Z requires deducting unity from β and adding the  
   coefficient of lagged Y, φ, to β-1. Coefficients for lag two and greater of X can be used as such.  
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                  (3.7)                     , 1
0
( ) ( )
L
it i i t i j it i it
j
Y Y Y Y X Xφ β− −
=
− = − + − +∑ μ .   
 
The second modification is to include current budget expenditures (divided by GDP) E minus its 
average as a regressor: 
 
               (3.8)           , 1 ,
0
( ) ( ) ( )
L
it i i t i it i j i t j i it
j
Y Y Y Y E E X Xφ λ β− − −
=
− = − + − + − +∑ μ . 
  
 
This addition is justified especially in the Russian case where federal transfers are allocated through 
a formula comparing region’s “tax potential” and “expenditure needs”. This addition does not, 
however, change the interpretation of interregional redistribution and insurance, i.e. the reaction of 
net transfers on permanent and temporary deviations of regional incomes from the long run average. 
Thus, adding the regional expenditures as a regressor serves as a robust check and it also gives us a 
sense of budget expenditure’s magnitude and significance in determining the federal transfers’ 
allocation.  
 
Table 4: Augmented model with first lag of Y and one to two lags of Xa, (Eq. 3.7)  
 
 Stabilization:      
Dynamic A-B,  
Eq. (3.7) 
A-B test for     
AR(1): z-value, 
(p-value) 
A-B test for 
AR(2): z-value,      
(p-value) 
Hansen test,       
χ2-value, 
(p-value)  
Number of 
instruments/ 
no. of groups 
   One X lag Σβ-j= φ=     
Rendered 
taxes  
-0.195 
 
+0.655*** 
(8.61) 
2.10 
(0.036) 
0.13 
(0.900) 
78.14 
(0.349) 
77/79 
Rendered 
taxes and 
transfers  
-0.255 
 
+0.470*** 
(9.27) 
1.82 
(0.069) 
0.55 
(0.584) 
78.56 
(0.336) 
77/79 
Rendered 
taxes, 
transfers and 
loans  
-0.270 
 
+0.458*** 
(9.16) 
1.95 
(0.051) 
0.35 
(0.726) 
77.87 
(0.357) 
77/79 
    Two X lags Σβ-j= φ=     
Rendered 
taxes  
-0.256 
 
+0.596*** 
(7.60) 
2.09 
(0.037) 
0.84 
(0.402) 
75.53 
(0.198) 
70/79 
Rendered 
taxes and 
transfers  
-0.222 
 
+0.645*** 
(11.97) 
1.94 
(0.053) 
0.81 
(0.416) 
77.39 
(0.159) 
70/79 
Rendered 
taxes, 
transfers and 
loans  
-0.220 
 
+0.664*** 
(13.03) 
1.96 
(0.051) 
0.61 
(0.545) 
76.94 
(0.168) 
70/79 
a. Y is net transfers and predetermined, X is exogenous. 
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Table 4. presents the basic regression results for equation (3.7) with two lags of Xit. Compared to 
dynamic M-Z replication in Table 3, the insurance estimates are now clearly lower, around 20-25% 
and close to the first difference model estimates. Interestingly the logic of wider accounting works 
with one lag but not with two. Actually there it works in the opposite direction. It is also important 
to note that the total insurance effect does not increase with the amount of included lags. The test 
statistics can be regarded as fairly good. The coefficients for Yt-1 are highly significant and positive 
which means that positive net transfers of previous period would produce positive net transfers in 
the consecutive period. This could relate to state dependence, i.e. that there are stable donor and 
recipient regions in the fiscal system. Indeed, this seems to be the case with the Russian data13.  
 
Next we will report the results for the second augmented model of equation (3.8) where also 
regional budget expenditures appear as a regressor. Budget expenditures are treated as endogenous 
since there is considerable danger of endogeneity embedded in the Russian transfer scheme. Table 
5. shows insurance estimates ranging from 25 to 36% which are a bit higher than in the first 
augmented model but lower than in the M-Z replication. Again the test statistics are at satisfactory 
levels. The accounting logic holds for one lag model whereas for two and three lag models it seems 
that taxes and budget loans have stabilizing effect whereas federal transfers have destabilizing 
effect. 
 
Regarding the lag of Y we find similar but somewhat higher estimates than in Table 4. and no clear 
accounting logic. The expenditure coefficients are highly significant and of expected sign. A higher 
expenditure needs are supported by higher federal fiscal flow. Interestingly, here the accounting 
logic works with two X lags but not with one. The variation in the estimates for first lag of Y is 
larger compared to dispersion in the insurance estimates. 
 
A noteworthy result in Table 5. is that when we add transfers and loans into the net transfers of our 
first lag model, the budget expenditures become insignificant. This might be due to multi-
collinearity. The same phenomenon is not, however, visible in two or three lag models. Appendix B 
reports the same regressions as in Table 5. but with disposable GRP as the dependent variable. The 
test statistics are partly better for the disposable GRP specification and the estimates with two and 
                                                 
13 Approximately 50 out of 79 regions in the data were either stable donors or recipients over the whole time horizon     
and clear majority of these were recipients. 
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three lags some 5 percentage points smaller. Also individual coefficients for current and lagged 
GRPs and their significance for Tables 4.  and 5. are reported in Appendix B. Although the 
difference is rather small, it is interesting since M-Z found that choosing between disposable GRP 
and net transfers as regressand had no notable influence on the results.  
 
Table 5: Augmented model with current expenditures, first lag of Y and one to three  
              lags of X as regressorsa (Eq. 3.8) 
 
 
Stabilization:  Dynamic A-B     
Eq. (3.8) 
A-B test for    
AR(1):       
z-value,     
(p-value) 
A-B test for 
AR(2):          
z-value,          
(p-value) 
Hansen test,   
χ2-value, 
(p-value)  
Number of 
instruments/ 
no. of groups 
  One X lag Σβ-j= φ= λ=     
Rendered 
taxes  
-0.271 +0.709***   
(10.74)    
+0.280***   
(10.24)    
2.21   
(0.027) 
0.49   
(0.624) 
75.16     
(0.440) 
78/79 
Rendered 
taxes and 
transfers  
-0.330 +0.459***  
(7.24)      
+0.183  
(1.33)      
1.71   
(0.088) 
0.58   
(0.560) 
78.66     
(0.334) 
78/79 
Rendered 
taxes, 
transfers and 
loans  
-0.346 +0.446*** 
(7.16)        
+0.170   
(1.17)    
1.74   
(0.082) 
0.39   
(0.697) 
77.68     
(0.362) 
78/79 
   Two X lags Σβ-j= φ= λ=     
Rendered 
taxes  
-0.295 +0.677***   
(10.52)    
+0.327***   
(9.63) 
1.91   
(0.056) 
1.03   
(0.303) 
77.05     
(0.291) 
76/79 
Rendered 
taxes and 
transfers  
-0.255 +0.707***   
(19.02)    
+0.333***   
(5.53)    
1.73   
(0.083) 
1.11 
(0.267) 
76.81     
(0.298) 
76/79 
Rendered 
taxes, 
transfers and 
loans  
-0.259 +0.721***   
(19.52) 
+0.329***   
(6.09)    
1.87 
(0.061) 
0.84 
(0.403) 
76.91     
(0.295) 
76/79 
 Three X lags Σβ-j= φ= λ=     
Rendered 
taxes  
-0.364 +0.639***   
(6.86)    
+0.344***   
(5.76)    
1.19 
(0.236) 
0.19 
(0.853) 
74.60     
(0.394) 
78/79 
Rendered 
taxes and 
transfers  
-0.323 +0.690***   
(7.76)    
+0.384***   
(10.67)    
1.23 
(0.220) 
0.56 
(0.574) 
77.62     
(0.304) 
78/79 
Rendered 
taxes, 
transfers and 
loans  
-0.335 +0.674***   
(7.47)    
+0.346***   
(8.65)    
1.39 
(0.164) 
0.26 
(0.796) 
76.33     
(0.341) 
78/79 
a. Y is net transfers and predetermined, X is predetermined, E is endogenous 
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4. Conclusions 
 
The paper focused on estimating interregional insurance and redistribution provided by the Russian 
fiscal system. Many econometric studies for interregional insurance have been made for European 
and North-American countries but this was only the second for Russia. We used the approach used 
by Mélitz and Zumer (2002). We also tested some simple but justified augmentations to their 
model. The main result of Mélitz and  Zumer was that substantial differences in estimation results 
of previous studies were due to differences in accounting choices rather than in the estimation 
techniques. Concerning our replicate of their methods would clearly suggest the opposite, i.e. that 
the estimation method causes most variation – some 20 percentage points – whereas the width of 
accounting causes at most five percentage point variation. However, the dynamic model used by 
Mélitz and Zumer produces some poor test values in our case. Relatively short time horizon and the 
consequent lack of instruments partly explain these results.  
 
More efficient results were obtained when first lag of the dependent variable and budget 
expenditures are included as regressors. Our most efficient results suggest that the insurance effect 
in Russia lies within the range of 20-35% between different estimation techniques and models. Also 
the estimates obtained with simple OLS techniques fall within this range. Estimates are more in line 
with the estimates obtained for European countries (20-40%) than those for the US and Canada (10-
20%). It is hard to find any systematic cause - such as accounting - to explain the differences in the 
Russian estimates. However, one factor – left untouched by Mélitz and Zumer – seems to be 
responsible for at least part of the variation in the dynamic model estimates. This is the amount of 
GRP lags included as regressors. However we observe that there is considerable variation in the 
estimates between different techniques, which would suggest that the estimation technique has 
importance at least for the results. But at the same time the estimates obtained with different 
techniques fall into this – admittedly large – range while no systematic cause behind the variation is 
evident.  
 
Concerning accounting differences we were unable to do as through inspection as Mélitz and Zumer 
did, but the differences in our estimates between different accounting choices were at most 7-8 
percentage points whereas Mélitz and Zumer obtained differences up to 20 percentage points. It is 
however impossible to robustly compare the two studies due to different fiscal system in Russia, 
and in US and Canada. Despite of this, we argue that accounting plays smaller role for Russia than 
 22
in US and Canada. An interesting result concerning accounting was that the robust logic of wider 
accounting and larger insurance visible in Mélitz and Zumer was not unambiguous in the Russian 
case. This would suggest that federal transfers in Russia have actually destabilizing or un-equalizing 
nature in Russia, which has been suggested already in earlier fiscal federalism literature, or that they 
are used in some other purpose such as equalizing regional budget revenue differences. 
 
It is important to bear in mind that empirical work concerning Russia is prone to more uncertainties 
than those with OECD countries. One possible reason for our somewhat unstable results (e.g. 
change in the signs of individual GRP coefficients in the dynamic models) is not necessarily a 
problem in the quality of data but due to turbulent nature of Russia’s transition. Interesting further 
applications would be to test for insurance in different time periods as there have been considerable 
differences in e.g. president Yeltsin’s and president Putin’s fiscal policy. Testing for shocks to 
budget incomes as in von Hagen and Hepp (2000) might be important as it captures the design od 
some transfer systems better. Furthermore, testing for shocks to regional personal income would 
also be useful and give us more tools to compare the Russian interregional insurance scheme 
internationally. 
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Appendix A: The data 
 
First of all, we are very grateful and highly indebted to the researchers of Moscow Institute for the 
Economy in Transition who were kind enough to provide us with the raw fiscal data for 1995-1999 
which was used also in Kadotchnikov et al. (2003). The rest of the raw data is obtained from 
Russia’s Ministry of Finance and National Statistical Committee (Rosstat). 
 
In constructing the net transfers measure, we tried to operate on a level as general as possible to 
reduce accounting uncertainties since the Russian budget reporting varies somewhat over the 
transition period. The summation of the following budget classes were used in constructing the net 
federal transfers data: 
1. Taxes and other compulsory payments rendered to the federal government appeared as a negative  
    flow in the net transfers.  
2. Non-repayable payments from the federal budget (including FFSR transfers, subsidies, subven- 
    tions and resources transferred under mutual settlement schemes) were used as a measure for  
    federal transfers whenever it was possible. In years when this budget class was not published,  
    we used the budget class Non-repayable transfers from budget of other levels.  
3. The net of budget loans (positive or negative) taken from and repaid to federal budget was used  
    in the widest accounting measure. Also in this case, in some years we had to use the more  
    obscure Budget loans from budgets of other levels. 
 
Major shortcoming is inability to include custom duty incomes, which are a major income source 
for many regions but statistics for them are unavailable. Also budget flows related to national 
defence are unavailable. Seventy nine of Russia’s eighty nine regions were included in the 
regressions. However, the data for the nine autonomous regions of Russia were embedded in the 
data under the respective administrative unit, e.g. the figures of Nenets autonomous regions is 
embedded in the data of Arkhangelsk region under which the Nenets region administratively 
belongs. This is due to the fact that GRP data for these autonomous regions is published only from 
year 2000 onwards. Only the Chechen Republic was dropped from the data due to highly unreliable 
and/or missing data.  
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Appendix B: More detailed results 
 
 
Table B1: Individual coefficients and their significance for Σβ-j for Table 4.  
 
 Lags β β-1 β-2
One: -0.250***    
(2.96)a
+0.056 
(1.36) 
 Rendered taxes  
Two: -0.370*** 
(3.65) 
+0.077 
(1.43) 
+0.038   
(0.93) 
One: -0.266***    
(3.31)    
+0.012   
(0.33) 
 Rendered taxes 
and transfers 
Two: -0.325***    
(3.78)    
+0.067    
(1.25)    
+0.036     
(1.18)    
One: -0.284*** 
(3.55) 
+0.014   
(0.40) 
 Rendered taxes, 
transfers and loans  
Two: -0.336***    
(3.85)    
+0.078    
(1.32)    
+0.038    
(1.41)    
a. Here and in the following tables the z-values are in the parentheses.  
 
 
 
Table B2: Individual coefficients and their significance for Σβ-j for Table 5.  
 
 Lags βa β-1 β-2 β-3
One: -0.335***    
(2.88)    
+0.065     
(1.16)    
  
Two: -0.349***    
(2.93)    
-0.038    
(0.67)    
+0.092**    
(2.01)    
 
Rendered taxes  
Three: -0.394***    
(2.81)    
-0.035     
(0.50)    
+0.014      
(0.53)    
+0.051 
(0.72)       
One: -0.329***     
(3.52)    
-0.001   
(0.02)     
  
Two: -0.304***    
(3.11)    
-0.033    
(0.58)    
+0.082***    
(2.80)    
 
Rendered taxes 
and transfers 
Three: -0.349***    
(3.23)    
-0.033    
(0.49)    
-0.006    
(0.24)    
+0.065    
(0.98)    
One: -0.348***    
(3.80)    
+0.002    
(0.05)    
  
Two: -0.328***     
(3.46)    
-0.010    
(0.858)     
+0.079***    
(3.09)    
 
Rendered taxes, 
transfers and loans  
Three: -.365***    
(3.46)    
-0.0167    
(0.23)    
-0.028   
(1.40)    
+0.075    
(1.21)    
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Table B3: Augmented model with current expenditures, first lag of Y and one to three  
                lags of  X as regressorsa  (Eq. 3.8) 
 
 
Stabilization: Dynamic A-B     
Eq. (3.8) 
A-B test for     
AR(1):  z-value,     
(p-value) 
A-B test for 
AR(2):  z-value,  
(p-value) 
Hansen test, 
χ2-value, 
(p-value)  
Number of 
instruments/ 
no. of 
groups 
  One X lag Σβ-j= φ= λ=     
Rendered taxes  -
0.271 
 
+0.709***  
(10.74)      
+0.280***   
(10.24)    
2.21 
(0.027) 
0.49   
(0.624) 
75.16     
(0.440) 
78/79 
Rendered taxes 
and transfers  
-
0.330 
 
+0.459*** 
(7.24)       
+0.183    
(1.33)    
1.71 
(0.088) 
0.58 
(0.560) 
78.66     
(0.334) 
78/79 
Rendered taxes, 
transfers and 
loans  
-
0.346 
 
+0.446***   
(7.16)    
+0.170    
(1.17)    
1.74 
(0.082) 
0.39 
(0.697) 
77.68     
(0.362) 
78/79 
   Two X lags Σβ-j= φ= λ=     
Rendered taxes  -
0.245 
 
+0.714***   
(14.21)    
+0.299***   
(7.04)    
2.13 
(0.033) 
0.56 
(0.577) 
74.88 
(0.354) 
76/79 
Rendered taxes 
and transfers  
-
0.220 
 
+0.725***   
(21.47)    
+0.303***   
(4.69)    
1.81 
(0.070) 
0.76 
(0.448) 
77.27     
(0.285) 
76/79 
Rendered taxes, 
transfers and 
loans  
-
0.225 
 
+0.752***   
(21.03)    
+0.320***   
(5.08)    
1.86 
(0.062) 
0.56 
(0.574) 
77.21     
(0.287) 
76/79 
 Three X lags Σβ-j= φ= λ=     
Rendered taxes  -
0.293 
 
+0.703***   
(9.33)    
+0.336***  
(6.08)    
1.41 
(0.157) 
0.24 
(0.810) 
72.43     
(0.464) 
78/79 
Rendered taxes 
and transfers  
-
0.247 
 
+0.763***   
(7.98)    
+0.376***   
(8.63)    
1.40 
(0.161) 
0.54 
(0.590) 
77.34     
(0.312) 
78/79 
Rendered taxes, 
transfers and 
loans  
-
0.245 
 
+0.755***   
(9.24)    
+0.345***   
(9.43)    
1.56 
(0.118) 
0.36 
(0.716) 
77.68     
(0.303) 
78/79 
a. Y is disposable GRP and predetermined, X (GRP) is predetermined, E is endogenous 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 26
Table B4: Individual coefficients and their significance for Σβ-j for Table B3.a  
 
 Lags β β-1 β-2 β-3
One: -0.335*** 
(5.71) 
+0.065*** 
(7.64)    
  
Two: -0.346*** 
(5.83)    
+0.053*** 
(9.82) 
+0.048    
(1.06)    
 
Rendered taxes  
Three: -0.385*** 
(4.65)    
+0.042*** 
(12.62)    
+0.021    
(0.57)    
+0.029    
(0.45) 
One: -0.329*** 
(7.16)    
-0.001*** 
(5.22)    
  
Two: -0.304*** 
(7.88)    
+0.044*** 
(13.18)    
+0.040     
(1.31)    
 
Rendered taxes 
and transfers 
Three: -0.343*** 
(6.62)    
+0.039*** 
(13.45)    
 +0.013    
(0.47)    
+0.044   
(0.64)    
One: -0.348*** 
(7.11)    
+0.002*** 
(5.18)    
  
Two: -0.323*** 
(7.45)    
+0.051*** 
(13.69)    
+0.046    
(1.72)    
 
Rendered taxes, 
transfers and loans  
Three: -0.352*** 
(6.36)    
+0.050*** 
(16.76)    
+0.012    
(0.49)    
+0.046    
(0.67)    
a. In this table the relevant transformations for βt and its lags for the summation of insurance coefficients are 
already made for the reported figures, i.e. β = (β-1) and β-1 = (β-1+φ). See footnote 12. 
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